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RECENT DECISIONS
Landlord and Tenant-Application of Implied Warranty: The
plaintiffs, four students at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, en-
tered into a written one-year lease with the defendant landlord for a
furnished house. The term of the lease was to commence Sept. 1, 1959.
The agreed rent was to be $175.00 per month prorated over nine months
and a sum stipulated as three month's rent was deposited in advance
of occupancy. The lease further provided that the house contain fur-
nishings suitable for student housing. During the negotiations in June,
1959, leading to this agreement, the defendant stated he would clean up
the house prior to its occupancy; the house at that time was in a con-
cededly filthy condition. Upon their arrival the plaintiffs found that no
improvement had been made in the condition of the premises. Discour-
aged with their own cleaning efforts they were advised by their attorney
to call the Madison building department. Several code violations were
found; these included inadequate wiring, toilet and sink facilities in
disrepair, furnace in disrepair and an absence of sufficient screens and
doors. The defendant was given until September 21st to correct the vio-
lations. The plaintiffs, however, quit the premises ten days prior to the
date set by the building inspector and brought this action for the return
of their deposit plus compensation for labor performed upon the leased
premises.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's judg-
ment for the plaintiffs, found that there was an implied warranty of
habitability in the lease which was breached by the defendant. The court
directed the trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount
of the deposit plus an amount recoverable for their labor less reasonable
rent for the period of their actual occupancy as determined by that
court. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 509, 111 N.W. 2d 409 (1961). 1
The great weight of authority supports the general rule that the lessor
does not impliedly covenant or warrant the premises to be in a tenantable,
fit or suitable condition.2 The law applies the doctrine of caveat emptor
'The trial court based its decision upon \Wis. STAT. §234.17 (1959): "Where
any building, which is leased or occupied, is destroyed or so injured by the
elements, or any other cause as to be untenantable, and unfit for occupancy,
and no express agreement to the contrary has been made in writing, the
lessee or occupant may, if the destruction or injury occurred without his fault
or neglect, quit and surrender possession of the leasehold premises, and of
the land so leased or occupied; and he is not liable to pay to the lessor or
owner, rent for the time subsequent to the surrender." The Supreme Court
however dismissed this in a summary manner: "We have doubt that Sec.
234.17, stats. applies under the facts of this case. In our opinion, there was an
implied warranty of habitability in the lease and that warranty was breached
by the appellant."
232 Azf. JUR. Landlord and Tenant §654 (1941); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant §485 (1947): I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.45 (1952); TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §908 (3rd ed. 1959).
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to this area since the lessee has opportunity to inspect the premises prior
to occupancy, 3 with the proviso that the landlord is liable for hidden
defects of which he does not apprise the tenant.4 The doctrine had its
origin in the common law where even the destruction of the leased
premises did not exempt the lessee from the duty to pay rent unless
provision was made for such a contingency in the written agreement
to protect the lessee against the general operation of the doctrine.5 Wis-
consin although having abrogated the harshness of this latter principle
still looks with disfavor upon implied warranties in conveyances of real
property and has by statutory provision virtually eliminated them ex-
cept as they pertain to wills and leases for a term not exceeding three
years.6
Operating within this area of the law classified as landlord and ten-
ant is a generally recognized exception to the general rule of caveat
emptor. This exception has been termed by the jurisdictions adhering
to it as an implied warranty of habitability. By virtue of its decision in
the instant case, the court has clearly placed Wisconsin within this
group." However, the implied warranty operates only within the limited
scope of short term leases of furnished premises." The doctrine is well
stated in the leading case of Ingalls v. Hobbs,9 wherein the court was
concerned with the rental of a furnished cottage for the summer vaca-
tion season. The lessee found the cottage infested with bugs, quit the
premises and refused to pay the rent for the remainder of the term. In
upholding the lessee's petition, the court enunciated the rule that in a
lease of a completely furnished house for a single season there is an
implied agreement that the house is fit for immediate habitation.10 Sub-
sequently the Massachusetts court in Hacker v. Nitschke"' applied this
rationale to a personal injury action rising out of a defective bunk bed
ladder in a furnished house, rented for four weeks. The doctrine has
also been applied to a twenty-six week lease of a furnished house where
there was a possibility of tuberculosis germs, 12 to an eight month tenancy
of furnished premises which were infested with bedbugs, 13 and also to
3 Auer v. Vahl, 129 Wis. 635, 109 N.W. 529 (1906); Ratte v. Meirjohan, 79
Ohio App. 387, 70 N.E. 2d 684 (1946) ; Kutchera v. Graft, 191 Iowa 1200, 184
N.W. 297 (1921).
4 Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E. 2d 644 (1942) ; Looney v. Smith,
96 N.Y.S. 2d 607 (1950).
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §908 (3rd. ed. 1939); This rule was changed by
statute in Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. §234.17 (1959).6 Wis. STAT. §235.02 (1959) ; Conveyance and purchaser defined at Wis. STAT.
§235.50 (1959).
7 Supra note 1, at 595, 111 N.W. 2d at 412: "We have not previously considered
this exception to the general rule."8 Supra note 5.
9 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
10 Ibid.
11 Hacker v. Nitschke, supra note 4.
.12 Collins v. Hopkins, [1923] 2 K.B. 617.
'3 Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 142, 116 At. 26 (1922).
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an unfurnished apartment in a multiple dwelling unit infested with
bedbugs.' 4 All the cases agree that an implied warranty of habitability
attaches to short term leases of furnished houses or apartments. The
Delameter case,'5 however, extends the implied warranty to an unfur-
nished apartment in a multiple dwelling unit. The courts' reasoning in
support of the warranty seems to be based on the fact that the lessee
does not have ample opportunity to inspect the premises prior to occu-
pancy and hence the harshness of the caveat emptor rule should not
apply.
The Wisconsin court in implying this warranty to a furnished house
extends the definition of "short term" to include a one year lease. Al-
though none of the previously cited cases have precisely defined the
duration of "short term," it has never been applied to a lease of this
length. The impact of this decision may have a far reaching effect, for
seemingly all leases of furnished dwellings or apartments, which are for
a term of one year or less, would carry with them an implied warranty
of habitability. The Pines decision would certainly affect student housing
in and around Wisconsin's colleges and universities where heretofore
the student has been somewhat at the mercy of the landlord due to the
supply and demand factor in furnished dwelling units. The landlord
under the Pines v. Perssion case would have to assure that the buildings
were in fact habitable or suffer the possibility of frequent breaches of
his lease agreements.
The factors determinative of the liability of the landlord to retain
the deposit and the non-liability of the tenants to pay further rent in
the instant case included the before mentioned building code violations,
which the court relies on heavily and the general "filthy" condition.16
None of the previously cited cases related the implied warranty to vio-
lations of the local building codes. The court, however, in passing on
the issues, was presented with three other factors that could have influ-
enced the decision and which may in future analogous situations deter-
mine whether the landlord or tenant shall prevail. First, and foremost,
was the landlord's own admittance that the premises were in a "filthy"
condition; second, the fact that the tenants were unable to inspect the
premises immediately prior to occupancy. Finally, that there was a non-
determined factual issue as to whether or not the landlord had promised
to repair the premises. To further qualify the general implications that
code violations would excuse tenants from the lease agreement the court
speaks of the desirability of eliminating protection for landlords who rent
"tumbledown" houses" but does not indicate that henceforth the lessee
14 Delameter v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428,239 N.W. 148 (1931).
31"bid.
16 Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W. 2d 409 (1961).
17Ibid.
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can rely on the technicalities of mere building code violations to abro-
gate his lease.
In adopting the exception to the general rule of caveat emptor, as
applied to implied warranties, Wisconsin has afforded a greater degree
of protection to the lessee who leases a furnished dwelling unit for one
year or less, although the exact grounds upon which his remedy can be
sought must await further court interpretation.
EDMUND C. CHMIELINSKI
Conspiracy-Evidentary Value of Conscious Parallelism: The
plaintiff in Delaware Valley Marine Supply Company v. American To-
bacco Company' sought treble damages against five tobacco companies
and their present distributor on the ground that the companies entered
into a conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-trust
Act2 by refusing to sell their tobacco products to the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff sought to organize a ship chandler concern, but, due to its inability
to obtain tobacco products, never commenced to do business. All five
tobacco companies were then selling to the defendant distributing com-
pany Lipschutz Bros., Inc., an already established and reliable firm. In
addition, two of the tobacco companies had a second outlet. Thus it ap-
pears, and the court so found, that the defendant companies already had
adequate representation in the market and that no real need for the
plaintiff's services existed. As is the usual case in actions brought under
Section 1, there was no direct evidence of an expressed agreement be-
tween the defendant companies. The Circuit Court of Appeals in affirm-
ing the trial court's directed verdict for the defendants viewed the evi-
dence most favorable to the plaintiff, thereby deciding the case under
the assumption that the five companies were each aware of the other's
refusal to deal with the plaintiff.
The Sherman Anti-trust provision under which the action was
brought in the main case is relatively clear. Its purpose is to prevent
conspiracies, a conspiracy being "a combination of two or more persons
by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose or to
accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal
or unlawful means."13 The difficulty arises in determining what is suf-
ficient proof of the existence of a conspiracy and then actually obtaining
the necessary quantum of proof. It is not necessary to prove a con-
spiracy by direct evidence of an express agreement, written or oral.
I Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F. 2d
199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, reported in B.N.A., Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep., No. 38, p. A-8 (April 3, 1962).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958) : "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
3 EuLER, MONOPOLIES AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS §16 (1929).
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